The failures of the Dutch highspeed rail project
Recently the high-speed rail company Eurostar announced that they were considering scrapping their services to the Netherlands in the coming years due to increasing reliability problems, capacity problems and delays for the passengers(1). If implemented this would practically remove all proper high-speed rail from the Netherlands and cut us off from connections to London and Paris. While I do not like Eurostar much with their extremely high prices and seats being difficult to book on a short notice do I however completely understand where they are coming from and do I find this a troubling development.
Let me be clear. High speed rail is a good thing. If implemented properly it can pull large urban areas closer together and put short to medium distance flights out of business, something that is very much needed if we are truly serious about becoming a more sustainable society and for tackling climate change. However there is the crux. If implemented properly. It has become painfully obvious that this is not the case in the Netherlands. The main high-speed line in the country, HSL-Zuid is supposed to be the flagship of the Dutch railroad network but for years now has it been a headache inducing project fraught with issues, delays and massive problems that exist on the structural level(both figuratively and literally). In a sense is the line the perfect example of the issues existing not only in Dutch public transit, but also in Dutch politics and Dutch society as a whole. In this article I want to highlight the history of the Dutch high-speed rail project, how it came to be like this and where we can go from here.
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| Spoorslag 70 Schedule book |
1. Spoorslag '70
To understand how we got into this situation it is important that we understand how the Dutch railway network developed in the 20th century. For this I propose that we start our story in the 1950's and 1960's. The car, plane and autobus were on the rise and rail traffic was decreasing globally. To tackle this problem NS(the Dutch state rail operator) had 2 options. Either scale down and close down lines that were considered unprofitable(firing a lot of people and decreasing general economic prosperity in the regions who would now lose their rail connections)(2) or come with a plan to modernize Dutch rail traffic and make passenger rail a viable mode of transit. Thankfully for us all chose the top brass at NS the latter. In the late 60's NS presented a plan to the government called "Spoor naar '75". This was a long term plan made by the NS with their visions on how this modernization would take place. In short the plan consisted of several points where NS wanted to make improvements. These included the implementation of clock face scheduling* to make all public transit integrated with each other and reduce waiting times(something still done till this day with great success in Switzerland). The modernization of existing infrastructure, more appealing stations, electrification, the whole shebang.They also pushed for an exemption for the NS to have a profit motive so that more finances could be directed to instead providing a good service considering that public transit is a public service, this was granted by the government. A new timetable with new categories of trains called "Spoorslag '70", we will discuss this soon. And finally introducing intermodality** to freight trains to reduce times that trains are stuck waiting in yards.(3)
All of this was a great success. From one year to another NS managed to increase train traffic by 40% and the amount of people using the train increased. Spoorslag '70 in particular was a big success. Turns out that when you run frequent and reliable public transit with a clear categories of what train goes where and how often that people are more likely to use the train. Who would have thought? The new categories of trains especially came in handy. The Netherlands was urbanizing rapidly in this time period and the need for trains that could accelerate and stop quickly became especially important for commuters living in smaller towns not too far from the cities where they worked. A lot of new neighborhoods were also constructed around already existing rail tracks, making these new places to live even more suitable for public transit. Meanwhile the new "intercity" category would work miracles on longer distance trains. That is not to say that there weren't issues. This new schedule meant that suddenly a lot more work was demanded from the already existing railroad equipment, meaning that maintenance was more frequent. This also meant that NS needed a lot of new rolling stock to keep up with the increased demand and this often meant that they had to lease equipment from other countries(most notably Germany and Belgium). However besides that was the plan and new schedule a great success. Within 20 years after it's implementation had the amount of travelers and demand grown high enough that NS was seeking out new Intercity routes and extended it's existing trains on the regular.
As the new 90's dawned however it seemed that changes were on the horizon. Changes more impactful then gabbers raving to Happy Hardcore or copying floppy disks with Commander Keen on them.
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| An original TGV Sud-Est next to a more modern TGV in Lyon |
2. Shinkansen, Train á Grande Vitesse, Intercity Express and more
There has always been a trend in railroading to make trains go faster. However an important milestone and the development of high-speed rail was the development of the Tokaido Shinkansen in 1964 in Japan. This dedicated right of way for high-speed rail connected Tokyo and Kyoto with each other and brought these two cities closer to each other by cutting the travel time between these cities essentially in half. Going from 6 hours and 40 minutes to 3 hours and 10 minutes in 1965(4). A massive success and other places in the world took notice.
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| An original Shinkansen Type 0 |
The United States did some experiments with both the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central experimenting with the Metroliner and Black Beetle trains respectively to mixed results. Meanwhile in Europe began many European countries(whose nationalized operators were more suited for the task) also experimenting and doing research into the feasibility of high-speed rail in their countries. Most notably France. The French were no stranger to going fast. In 1955 the SNCF(The French national railway operator) managed to beat the world speed record for electric locomotives with the BB 9004 and CC 7107, reaching a top speed of 331km/h(5). However even with this in the bag was the process of getting high-speed rail up and running a daunting one. The climate for trains in the 60's and 70's was not a friendly one. The general public in both North America and Europe considered trains to be an outdated mode of transit and the rise of budget airliners especially caused the public to question the necessity of trains. The fact that many European countries were still running Steam locomotives well into the 60's did not do a lot for the image. Trains were considered old fashioned, outdated and dirty among many. Nevertheless the SNCF persevered and they began experimenting with gas turbine trainsets. First with the Turbotrains(some of which got exported to America where Amtrak began using them as the RTG and RTL Turboliner trainsets)(6)(7). The SNCF ran these trains on their intercity lines where they gathered valuable data and experience for the engineers at SNCF and Alstom to start work on what would eventually become the TGV Sud-Est.
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| On the left, a SNCF Turbotrain. On the right an Amtrak RTL Turboliner |
When you want high-speed rail in your area then there are generally speaking two approaches you can take to it. Method 1 involves building your own right of way. This is the preferred method because high-speed rail requires smooth grades and it allows you to eliminate any level crossings. This means you can reach high speeds and have special rail corridors specifically meant for high-speed rail. Of course the major downside of this method is that it requires the construction of a lot of new infrastructure which is a pricey affair. The second method involves upgrading already existing rail infrastructure and therefore allowing higher speeds to be ran on those lines. This is done by removing steep curves in the tracks and upgrading the signalling to allow for higher speed operations. The upside of this method is that it is cheaper, the downside is that you are kind of limited to how fast you can go. France and Japan chose the first method, Germany and the US chose the second method.
The first high-speed line France built was LGV Sud-Est, running from Paris to Lyon. This made sense, connecting France's largest and third largest city with each other would be a busy route and even today is it the most used LGV in France. Initially was the SNCF gonna run the TGV service using gas turbine trainsets. They even made a prototype for this called TGV 001 which performed very well. However in 1973 the oil crisis hit. In many regards was this oil crisis a blessing in disguise for European rail transit(though it probably did not feel like that at the time). The oil crisis did two things. Firstly it meant that the French government suddenly found themselves in a position where they had a growing energy demand but a dwindling supply of fossil fuels that was only getting more expensive, meaning that as a result they decided to build a lot more nuclear power plants to fill up the gaps. Secondly it meant that budget airliners and cars, the main transit rivals of rail transit were suddenly getting a lot more expensive. This was all perfect for the TGV. It did mean a design change however, going from gas turbine to electric. This meant the designing of a new pantograph that could withstand the high speed and the building of overhead wires suitable for speeds of 300km/h and up. This caused admittedly delays but it did mean that in 1981 the SNCF could finally debut it's high-speed rail services. A part of the original TGV that many people don't mention but I think was very important was the ad campaign and aesthetics of the design. To streamline the trainsets SNCF had hired industrial designer Jacques Cooper whom had worked at the design bureau of Raymond Loewe(famous for iconic streamlined locomotives like the Pennsylvania Railroad's GG1) and he did an amazing job creating a look for the train that was both modern and suitable for the tastes of European travelers at the time.
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| The original TGV 001 |
All in all a massive success. The success of the original TGV Sud-Est and the similarly named LGV meant the expansion of high-speed rail in France across the decades and the beginning of high-speed rail projects in other European countries as well. Germany would debut their ICE 1 in 1991. Italy had been running their Pendolino trainsets since 1988 and even the UK experimented with high-speed trains to... mixed results. All of this meant that the Netherlands and the other low countries could not be left behind.
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| The rail stretch combining both HSL-Zuid and the Belgian HSL4 |
3. Hogesnelheidslijn
The origins of the Dutch high-speed rail project goes back to 1978, when the Dutch government saw the development in other countries and decided to start up their own projects. The main task for this was given to NS since they were the only rail operator at the time. However the project was spending a lot of time in the fridge and it was not till 1988 that something tangible came out of it. NS presented their vision of high-speed rail in a future plan called "Rail 21". This was a plan of NS for future proofing the Dutch railway network and included for the most part electrification and double-tracking of already existing railway lines(8). Although many parts of the plan were adopted, a lot was also not for reasons that will become clear later. For our purposes the most important parts of the plan are the plans involving high-speed lines. NS's initial vision for the plan involved the creation of three high-speed lines. Namely HSL-Zuid, connecting Amsterdam - Schiphol and Rotterdam to connecting high-speed lines(via HSL4) in Belgium to Antwerpen - Brussels and so on to Paris. HSL-Oost, a connection from Amsterdam to Utrecht and Arnhem to Germany. And finally HSL-Noord(later renamed to Zuiderzeelijn) connecting Amsterdam to Groningen via the then new province of Flevoland. These plans were very well received by the Dutch government at the time, but around the mid 90's sometimes changed.
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| An appromixation of where HSL-Oost could have potentially been built |
You see around that time period a spirit began to haunt Europe, the spirit of Neoliberalism. The new European Union came with a dose of Austrian school of economics and this meant privatization and the breaking up of state owned operators with directive 91/440(9). The plan that a few years ago was still lauded by the Dutch government suddenly was not acceptable anymore in this new neoliberal Netherlands and Europe. The idea was that having a national railway operator would make railway operation "less efficient" and that therefore privatization and competition was needed to "improve the efficiency of the new integrated European railway network". As a result went NS and the Dutch railway network through a process called "Liberalization". To make a long story short, the Dutch railway network was split between the main railway network(hoofdrailnet) and smaller lines that would be privatized. NS would keep the concession on the main railway network(and as of writing they still have this concession) while the smaller lines(which are usually not electrified and only single tracked) would be run by private operators. Furthermore would NS no longer be responsible for both freight rail and maintenance of the infrastructure. The freight division of NS would be split off into a private company called NS Cargo(Later on bought by Raillon and DB Schenker) while maintenance would be coordinated by an organization called Prorail who would give concessions to private companies(like volkerrail etc) for maintaining the network. Finally around the mid 90's would the NS be given a mandate to make a profit, thus turning it into a what I have coined "quasi-nationalized" state. The Dutch government still owns a 100% of NS but they run it like a private company with a profit motive. Anyone that can has some knowledge about Neoliberal economics can probably tell you why this was an awful idea.
This all meant that the vision regarding Dutch high-speed rail had to change as well. No longer was it something in the hands of state operators, but rather something that had to be done by a consortium of this new thing that the Netherlands loves. The dreaded "public-private partnership". Most projects from the original Rail 21 plan were scaled back or flat out cancelled in the wake of this. Looking at the plans for HSL-Oost it became clear in the new paradigm that it was an expensive project for what the politicians at the time saw as "very little gain" so after a few years of umming and erring was the project unceremoniously cancelled in July of 2000(10). Some studies were done after the cancelling to see if it was possible to speed up the stretch between Utrecht and Arnhem but besides some minor studies is HSL-Oost currently in limbo and besides some calls from local politicians sometimes is it probably fair to label this project as dead. HSL-Noord fared slightly better. The demand for a direct connection between Groningen and the Randstad has been around for a while now and a lot of ideas and studies were floated around on how to realize this. This ranges from conventional rail via different routes to even proposal of a maglev(11). Nevertheless in the end HSL-Noord(Now known as the Zuiderzeelijn) was unceremoniously cancelled in 2007 for reasons similar to HSL-Oost. Too high costs for allegedly very little gain. With that said does the Zuiderzeelijn live on in plans for the new Lelylijn, a conventional rail connection between Amsterdam and Groningen that has been in the planning for a while(12). Unfortunately once again the planning shows that it is a lot more expensive then the government had originally anticipated so I will be very surprised if we are seeing development in this anytime soon(13).
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| Possible destinations Zuiderzeelijn(formerly HSL-Noord) |
Which leaves HSL-Zuid as the only remaining high-speed line. I am pleased to report that unlike the other two HSL-Zuid was actually built and is an actual tangible rail line that trains run on. Unfortunately is that however where my good news ends because this project has been a disaster from it's very inception to the current day. To build the line the Dutch government started a public-private partnership consortium under the name "infraspeed"(14). This includes the Dutch government itself but also local construction companies, maintenance companies and companies like Siemens for construction of the signalling systems among other things. The line was built between 2000 and 2006 and was first taken into service around 2009. Like other parts of the Dutch rail network is service on the line something that a concession can be given for and there are several parties involved here. As of writing is the main high speed carrier on HSL-Zuid a company called Eurostar(formally known as Thalys) which provides high speed trains to Antwerpen, Brussel, Paris and London(among other destinations). Unique however among high speed lines is that NS(and the Belgian Railways) also runs a more regular intercity service on the line.
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| The much loathed V250 |
NS had the initial plan to run a high-speed intercity service on the line. To do this however they needed new rolling stock so together with the Belgian Railways(whom they worked with a lot to get the project off the ground) they approached an Italian company called AnsaldoBreda(nowadays part of Hitachi) to create some suitable rolling stock for them. After many delays, this company would deliver something called the V250 trainset to both the Netherlands and Belgium. These sets were electric multiple units that could run with a top speed of 250km/h across the line. This service, called Fyra by NS and Belgian Railways would run direct intercity services from Amsterdam to Schiphol Airport, Rotterdam, Breda, Noorderkempen(BE), Antwerpen and Brussel. The train-sets were put in service around December 2012, about a month later in January 2013 were they already taken off the tracks.
If you ask any Dutch person nowadays about Fyra you will not hear any good words about the service or the trains that the service was ran with. The train sets were plagued with technical issues and many delays during construction. When the sets were finally put into service they proved to be unsafe, uncomfortable and flat out dangerous to run. The sets could not deal with the wetter climate of the low countries and had issues with starting up(15). On the 15th of January 2013 were about half of the trains unable to run. Two days later on the 17th had that percentage gone up to 85%(16). As a result were the Dutch and Belgian railways forced to put in replacement buses between Amsterdam, Breda, Roosendaal and Antwerpen and Brussel. The final nail in the coffin however was an incident at the 15th where a piece of the floor beneath the train had gotten loose at high speed and was later on found on the track in Belgium. After this disastrous month the trains were taken off the tracks and both NS and Belgian Railways began an investigation to figure out what happened. A few months later both the Belgian and Dutch railways released their reports and the results were shocking.
On the 31st of May the Belgian Railways cancelled their order for the remaining Fyra trainsets, stopped using the trainsets and released a report which highlighted the issues they had run into in their investigation(17). Some highlights included: Major issues with waterproofing, Rust problems with the wheel axles, poor finishing of the hydraulics and power cables beneath the train, making them vulnerable to ballast from the tracks, technical differences between the sets, braking system that was not designed for the speeds that the sets were supposed to run on, battery sets that could easily catch fire and were poorly protected. NS came with their own report around the same time that came to the same conclusion though they did note that: "Though the design of the train sets are solid, the shoddy construction and lack of trust in AnsaldoBreda to fix these issues means that we will not be continuing the use these trains"(18). What followed was a judicial battle between the Dutch and Belgian Railways on one side and the manufacturer AnsaldoBreda on the other. After some legal tug of war Dutch railways came to an agreement with AnsaldoBreda and returned their sets for a sum of 125 million euros, 88 million euros less then was paid by NS(19). Belgian railways would soon follow with a similar agreement(20).
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| Batteries below the passenger compartment which caught fire |
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| Damage done by the snow |
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| Broken Hydraulics cables below the train |
However there now was a problem. NS now had a service which it had no rolling stock for. The Fyra had become a laughing stock for the Dutch public and the entire affair was a mess. NS wanted to keep running intercity trains on the high-speed line but they did not have the correct rolling stock for it and probably would not get the correct rolling stock for a while. So a stopgap was needed. NS and the Belgian Railways put their heads together and came up with a solution. Instead of getting fancy train sets would both railways lease a series of Bombardier Traxx locomotives and instead run regular loco hauled trains using NS ICR coaches from the 1980's. This was not an elegant solution, the rolling stock was older and less shiny and the locomotives were limited to a top speed of 160km/h(as opposed to the 250km/h that the V250 promised) but at least they would have a train. The name Fyra would change as well considering the bad reputation that the service had gotten and got rebranded as Intercity Direct. Since then has the Intercity Direct run from Amsterdam to Brussel using this rolling stock while NS took a step back and bought itself some time to come up with a new plan.
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| NS Intercity Direct Traxx train |
However there was an issue with a lack of trust from the public. The entire affair had been a massive embarrassment for NS and things were about to get worse for them.
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| Portion of HSL-Zuid near Lage Zwaluwe |
5. A shiny line that is falling apart
Intercity Direct was at first a moderate success. It was not the fastest train in Europe but at least NS and Belgian Railways would have a train running on the high speed line next to the high speed trains from Eurostar and Thalys. This created an unique situation where a regular intercity train could utilize the high speed line to bypass some of regular lines and create a more direct connection between Breda, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. I myself actually used this train a few times back in the day to get from Breda to Amsterdam and at the time I considered it to be a decent experience. The supplement they charged between Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport is something I find to be somewhat unnecessary but for 3 euros it could be worse I suppose. Unfortunately was it not to be. A few years after it came into usage did inspections reveal that HSL-Zuid was slowly sinking into the ground(21). Allegedly this is due to construction errors made during the construction of the foundation. Furthermore in 2022 it became clear that cracks were starting to appear in several places in viaducts and elevated sections of the line, causing Prorail to implement speed restrictions of 80km/h in several place(22). Finally it became clear that the stopgap Traxx locomotives were not really suited for operation on the line, causing damage to the line and issues involving locomotives breaking down in the middle of it due to said locomotives not being made to deal with the complex voltage switching that the line requires when you get on or off on it.(23). It has also been speculated that the new ICNG train sets that NS is getting for operation on the line to replace the Traxx sets might also not be suitable for the line. All in all has this turned the entire project into a massive headache dossier for NS and by an extension the Dutch government. The intercity Direct is more often delayed then it is not, and that is provided it does not break down in the middle of the track, causing trains to be cancelled or holding up other trains from Eurostar. Keeping all of this in mind is it not surprising that Eurostar is considering cutting service to the Netherlands in general.
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| ICNG trainset |
I want to take a moment now to stand still and ponder a bit about why this all happened. Not so much the technical details but the ideology and thought process that policy makers went through that caused this all to happen. In the 90's Europe(and other parts of the world) went to a shift in political thinking. Before things like public transit, healthcare, education etc were often seen as a public service. The idea of the European welfare state that developed after WW2 was that the state would provide basic necessities for someone to live a good life so that they in term could get the head start they needed to develop themselves both personally and economically. Now there are criticisms you can make of Social Democratic welfare states(Mostly in how they were funded by exploiting the global south) but it cannot be denied that they helped improve the lives of thousands if not millions of people. The thing is however that providing this platform was expensive. In the 80's the Austrian school of economics became popular in the United States and it's ideology of Neoliberalism was pioneered by American President Ronald Reagan and UK Premier Margaret Thatcher. Via these two vectors did this ideology and political thought also found it's way in the Netherlands and in the late 80's the government began with a gradual implementation of privatization and implementation of market economics in what used to be public services.
The argument that was made at the time was that these services had gotten too expensive and inefficient for the state to run and that privatizing them and leaving them to the market would make them both cheaper and more efficient. This was a lie. I want to make this very clear. If anyone every tells you that privatizing something makes it more efficient then they are lying through their teeth. However this was(and is) the prevailing thought that was being developed at the time and so the government went ahead and privatized everything. Which also meant that the development of new infrastructure projects had to be left up to the market. Back in the day if NS wanted to build a new rail line they would just design the line in house, and get maybe one or two contractors to build the thing under NS supervision. This worked because it meant that NS(And by extension the Dutch government) was in control of everything. However when it came to HSL-Zuid this had to be done via a consortium. Meaning that there were a million contractors and parties involved whom all wanted a piece of the pie with their own profit motives. The result was shoddy work and an overinflated budget for something that should have been done way cheaper and better. We are now almost 20 years after HSL-Zuid was finished and we have a line that is slowly sinking into the ground, falling apart, with a unreliable intercity service that might also soon lose what little genuine high speed rail we have. Researching this subject has been extremely frustrating for me as both a railfan and an urbanist because I know what we could have had instead.
You see back in the late 90's. Before the NS was completely turned into a company with a profit making mandate, before bus transit was privatized, before the worst brainrot of Neoliberalism had fully set in did NS come with a plan. The government had set out a concession for the soon to be built HSL-Zuid and NS was one of the many who applied for this concession with a plan. In September of 1999 came NS with a report called "Bestijg nooit de trein zonder uw valies met dromen"(Never enter the train without your suitcase of dreams)(24). This was a wordy title for an admittedly ambitious plan. You see NS saw the coming of HSL-Zuid as an opportunity to future proof the entire network. This involved the creation of a so called "Intercity Max" train category. Certain important rail corridors would be upgraded and future proofed with more modern signaling systems allowing higher speeds of 160km/h on regular lines(as opposed to the 140km/h that the limit is currently) while the trains would run seamlessly on HSL-Zuid with a speed of 220km/h using Shinkansen series E1 trainsets. Right next to the Thalys trains. Furthermore would the entire train system across the entire country be overhauled. With former intercity's and regional trains being called Citylink trains while big cities would get an S-Bahn like system for so called SterSprinter trains. This plan was ambitious yes, it was beyond the scope of what the government asked for yes. However it was forward thinking and if planned properly also doable. The plan would have integrated NS's operations with all of the regional bus transit companies as well and even allowed for the growth of the economy beyond just the railroad, with the creation of new stations and areas to develop around said stations. The plan was sensible, budgeted properly and thought in the long term. So obviously the government rejected it. This was done on the grounds that it went beyond the scope of what the government had asked for and that furthermore it did not involve enough market forces.
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| Intercity Max network |
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| Intercity Max train types |
For me this is extremely frustrating. Here we have a well thought out plan that though ambitious does sound to be very doable if planned properly and it gets rejected just because of pure ideology. It is frustrating because it is a good example of the issues the Netherlands(and to a greater extent the western world) are dealing with that goes far beyond just trains and railroads. This narrow vision on just profit and market forces that comes with Neoliberal thinking blinds people from making the right decisions and instead it is just one mistake after the other. Every time this happens there is always at least one high ranking politician that goes "gee how did this happen?", completely oblivious of the systemic issues that are dangling right in front of their face. Every decision that is made is the wrong one and with every decision more lives get destroyed, more money and resources are lost and more the environment goes to hell.
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| Belgian Traxx 3 locomotives we might see in the future |
7. What happens next?
As I am writing this has NS put their new ICNG train sets into service. Some of them already run on HSL-Zuid but for the most part is the Intercity Direct from Antwerpen to Brussel still done using Traxx locomotives and coaches. NS is currently testing a version of the ICNG called ICNG-B which can also run on Belgian overhead wires which should replace some of the Traxx trains. However Belgian railways is currently in the process of acquiring some newer Traxx locomotives from Alstom which should hopefully be able to run at higher speeds(200km/h) which they are planning to run with some of their new I11 coaches. It remains to be seen if these newer locomotives will keep creating issues on the line. As for the line itself, I am skeptical that it's technical problems are gonna be fixed anytime soon. The current Dutch far right government from hell seems to be continuing the Neoliberal cause of austerity on public transit(despite promising during the elections that they were not gonna do that) and budget cuts are coming for all sectors safe for the rich, the military, cops and agriculture. Meanwhile the country is being mismanaged to hell faster then ever before as a squabbling group of toddlers that I hesitantly call the Dutch cabinet continues to push their own agenda of moving to Fascism as quickly as possible.
It is very clear that there is no political will within Dutch electoral politics right now that seems to be either able or willing to deal with the mess that comes after 20+ years of Neoliberal austerity. HSL-Zuid is only one example of many things that went to hell in a hand-basket but it is a poignant one. As a people we can do better then this. We demand better public transit and if we want it then we need to put pressure on those in power to make it happen. If that means strikes or protests then so be it. We are reaching a breaking point and it is up to us make the pendulum swing back the other way. My hope is for Dutch left wing activist groups to keep this into their consideration when determining their next move.
We all deserve better transit.
Sources/notes:
1. https://nltimes.nl/2024/09/19/eurostar-cut-dutch-stop-issues-high-speed-line-amsterdam-cs-renovations
2. https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoorslag_%2770#Maatschappelijke_functie
3. https://wiki.ovinnederland.nl/wiki/Spoor_naar_%2775
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinkansen
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VC5QRP1BnLY
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turbotrain
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turboliner
8. https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_21
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_European_Railway_Directive_2012
10. https://web.archive.org/web/20200625041959/https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/netelenbos-blijft-tegen-dubbel-spoor-hsl-oost~bb73598c/
11. https://web.archive.org/web/20190326074816/http://www.infrasite.nl/projects/project.php?ID_projecten=376
12. https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lelylijn
13. https://nos.nl/artikel/2538213-lelylijn-tussen-noorden-en-randstad-flink-duurder-dan-begroot-10-miljard-meer
14. https://www.railwaygazette.com/news/infraspeed-wins-hsl-zuid-ppp/28368.article
15. https://web.archive.org/web/20150602074606/http://www.ns.nl/over-ns/nieuwscentrum/persberichten/2012/12/ns-en-nmbs-pakken-gezamenlijk-opstartperikelen-fyra-aan.html
16. http://www.treinreiziger.nl/geen-fyra-tussen-amsterdam-en-brussel-door-winterweer/
17: http://web.archive.org/web/20130611235426/http://media.rtl.nl/media/financien/rtlz/2013/NMBS-fyra.pdf
18. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/06/03/ns-bevestigt-einde-fyra-a1434236
19. https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/ns-stuurt-fyra-terug-naar-italie-en-krijgt-125-miljoen~b1b9390e/?referrer=https://en.wikipedia.org/
20. http://web.archive.org/web/20141109225922/http://www.finmeccanica.com/en/-/ferrovie-belghe-ansaldobreda-belgianrailways-ansaldobreda
21. https://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/2075175/hsl-zuid-verzakt-en-mos-zorgt-voor-problemen-herstel-kost-15-miljoen-euro
22. https://nos.nl/artikel/2528184-snelheid-op-hsl-verder-omlaag-nog-maar-80-kilometer-per-uur-bij-vijf-viaducten
23. https://www.treinreiziger.nl/traxx-treinen-veroorzaken-e-50-miljoen-schade-aan-hsl-en-ook-icng-voldoet-formeel-niet/
24. https://pdfcoffee.com/ns-reizigers-voorstel-voor-de-hsl-zuid-pdf-free.html
*: Clock face scheduling is a practice in terms of railroad planning where instead of having trains run on demand(like in peak hours) they instead run on a fixed schedule and frequency that is easy to remember for the passenger(Like a train going twice per hour at :15 and :45). If integrated with other forms of public transit it in theory reduces waiting times and reliability.
**: Intermodal freight transit is when freight is moved around across different forms of transit(Trains, boats, trucks) without needing to change packaging or spending a lot of time repackaging the freight. It is usually done with containers
More photos of the issues with the Fyra can be found here: https://engineeringnet.be/nl/nieuws/item/4638/20-hallucinante-fotos-van-schade-aan-fyra
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